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What would John Griffith have made of
Jonathan Sumption’s Reith Lectures?
MARTIN LOUGHLIN
Abstract
In his 2019 Reith Lectures on the rise of law and decline of politics, Jonathan Sumption pre-
sents a thesis that, on its face, seems identical to that of J.A.G. Griffith’s defence of the politi-
cal constitution. Given the radical differences in their views on equality, democracy, and
redistribution—with Griffith working in the tradition of democratic socialism espoused by
the Webbs, Tawney and Laski, and Sumption expressing the libertarian philosophy under-
pinning Thatcherite policies—this is puzzling. This article sets their views in historical and
political context and argues that the similarities are superficial, whereas the differences are
profound. It then proceeds to show the weaknesses in Sumption’s defence of his thesis.
Keywords: equality, democracy, law, politics, J.A.G. Griffith, Jonathan Sumption, R.H. Taw-
ney
I
IN HIS chorley lecture of 1979, John Griffith
gave a powerful defence of what he called ‘the
political constitution’.1 His target was an
emerging coalition of Liberal and Conservative
lawyers then advocating reform of the British
constitution. The reformers were proposing
intellectual renewal by resurrecting natural
rights theories and institutional renewal by
making the European Convention of Human
Rights enforceable in domestic law. Griffith’s
objections to these proposals were both philo-
sophical and political. Arguing that law was
being elevated from its proper function as a
means to an end into some metaphysical
entity, he maintained that, once realised, the
effect would be to place the resolution of
important political questions in the hands of a
legal elite happily engaged in the scholastic
task of not only determining the meaning of
such abstract freedoms as thought, expression
and association, but also of resolving how
those freedoms were to be qualified in the
interests of national security, public safety,
protection of public order, public health, or
economic wellbeing. Such political decisions
should be made by those who remain account-
able and removable. Law, he concluded, pro-
vides no substitute for politics.
Griffith’s argument was not novel. His
lecture expressed a view on the relationship
between law and politics that had been
consistently espoused from the 1920s by
public lawyers like William Robson and
Ivor Jennings, whose legal thought had
been shaped by democratic socialist politics.
Taking their intellectual inspiration from the
Webbs, Tawney and Laski, they promoted
a conception of rights that remained relative
to function and were adamant that the
common law judiciary wedded to laissez-
faire and protection of property rights was
unsuited to discharge the task of rights
adjudication. Social rights were to be pro-
mulgated in parliamentary legislation and
made real by executive officials committed
to the pursuit of the common good and
held accountable for the exercise of those
powers through administrative processes.
The rule of law should certainly be upheld
if by that was meant public bodies keeping
within the limits of their statutory powers.
But in the hands of the judiciary that
phrase had become a fog of words, or as
Griffith put it in his lecture, ‘a fantasy
invented by Liberals of the old school in
the late nineteenth century and patented by
Tories to throw a protective sanctity around
certain legal and political institutions and
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principles which they wish to preserve at
any cost’.2
The early twentieth century socialist jurists
maintained that a new type of jurisprudence
was needed to meet the challenges of the
emerging positive state. Their arguments
were in direct conflict with the orthodoxy of
Victorian constitutionalists who had
expressed great anxiety about the coming of
democracy. A.V. Dicey, the leading Victorian
constitutional lawyer, initially had been
more sanguine than many about the ‘leap in
the dark’ of Disraeli’s Reform Act, but by
the early twentieth century he had changed
his mind. Faith in parliamentary govern-
ment, he now saw, had been suffering an
extraordinary decline. Legislation passed
under the influence of ‘socialistic ideas’ was
sapping the foundations of liberty and, with
the loss of the Lords’ veto power in 1911,
the last effective constitutional safeguard had
been destroyed.
This Victorian mentality remained the
dominant legal worldview until the latter
half of the twentieth century, when it was
gradually displaced by a grudging accep-
tance that the administrative state was here
to stay. But the arguments of the socialist
jurists never gained a foothold in the legal
establishment and, as it turned out, Griffith’s
Chorley lecture was to be the swan song of
that movement. In that year, the Conserva-
tives came to power driven by a powerful
new ideology and over four successive terms
they radically restructured the British state.
Through a sustained programme of privati-
sation, deregulation and the institutionalisa-
tion of market disciplines in those public
services that remained, they permanently
altered the character of the modern British
state.
Much of the intellectual groundwork of
the Thatcher revolution had been laid in the
1970s by Sir Keith Joseph, her closest politi-
cal ally. A disciple of F.A. Hayek and Milton
Friedman, in 1979 Keith Joseph published a
book on Equality with Jonathan Sumption.
Written for the specific purpose of counter-
ing Tawney’s influential book from 1931
with the same title, they claimed that Taw-
ney’s argument ‘had been lost in the ocean
of instinctive approval’. Just as Tawney’s
study explained the socialist conception of
equality, Joseph and Sumption’s illuminated
the creed of inequality at the heart of the
Thatcherite project. And whereas Tawney
begins with an approving reference to Mat-
thew Arnold’s criticism that ‘in England
inequality is almost a religion’, Joseph and
Sumption present Arnold as ‘typical of the
many egalitarians for whom inequality was
. . . a fraud deliberately worked by powerful
men in their own interest’.3
This backstory is pertinent. Forty years
later, following his retirement from the UK
Supreme Court to which he had been
appointed directly from practice at the bar in
2012, Lord Sumption was invited to give the
2019 Reith Lectures. No surprise there per-
haps: his predecessors include such distin-
guished former judges as Lords Radcliffe
and McCluskey. But his chosen theme was
the rise of law and the decline of politics
and, disconcertingly, his thesis is identical to
Griffith’s. In earlier lectures he had claimed
that drawing the boundary line between law
and politics is the biggest problem facing
English law.4 In the Reith lectures, Sumption
argues that although courts have the impor-
tant task of preventing governments exceed-
ing their powers, their recent more active
role in reviewing the merits of government
policy decisions is a usurpation which
undermines the value of the political process.
He also closely follows the logic of Griffith’s
argument in specifically targeting the way
that domestication of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights has exacerbated this
tendency by enabling the judiciary to dis-
cover and enforce rights that are neither fun-
damental nor uncontentious.
How is it possible that lawyers espousing
radically different political views and coming
from different political traditions hold such
apparently similar views on the limits of the
law and the value of politics?
II
Some might seek to explain these similarities
with reference to the political changes that
have taken place over the forty years since
Griffith’s lecture was published. That is not
enough; after all, the clearest statement of
Sumption’s political views was published in
the same year as Griffith’s lecture. That said,
if, as seems justified, we use Tawney as the
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surrogate for Griffith’s beliefs on equality,
then of course there is a significant time gap
between Tawney’s work on equality and
Sumption’s. And this is relevant because—
although Griffith would undoubtedly have
rejected this—one of Sumption’s main claims
in Equality is that since Tawney’s day ‘class
distinctions have faded to the point where
they are no more significant than the shape
of a man’s hat and the intervals at which he
is paid’.5 This leads him to present his basic
thesis: that the striving for equality today is
born of envy and the narcissism of small dif-
ferences.
The difference between Sumption and
Tawney on this critical political question is
vast. In Equality, Tawney rejects the sugges-
tion that the principle of equality can be
reduced either to formal legal equality or to
some minimal sense of equality of opportu-
nity. He dismisses the idea that formal
equality or, what amounts to the same thing,
economic liberty is ‘sufficient prophylactic
against the evils produced by social stratifi-
cation’. This type of equality simply frees
property and enterprise from social restraints
and leads to division. The appeal to such a
general principle also conceals the essential
point that the character of a society ‘is deter-
mined less by abstract rights than by practi-
cal powers’. That is, the character of a
society rests ‘not upon what its members
may do, if they can, but upon what they can
do, if they will’.6
The main target of Tawney’s critique,
however, is a narrow conception of equality
of opportunity. Equality of opportunity is
valuable only when ‘each member of a com-
munity, whatever his birth, or occupation, or
social position, possesses in fact, and not
merely in form, equal chances of using to
the full his natural endowments of physique,
of character, and of intelligence’. He is scath-
ing about the claim that only those with
unusual talents might have some possibility
of escaping the circumstances of their birth.
Without a large measure of actual equality,
such opportunities to ‘rise’ must necessarily
be illusory. Any doctrine which puts the
emphasis on opening avenues to individual
advancement remains ‘partial and one-
sided’.7
Tawney does not argue for some crude
Procrustean sense of equality. He recognises
that inequality of power is justified when
that power is used for approved social pur-
poses and ‘when it is not more extensive
than that purpose requires, when its exercise
is not arbitrary, but governed by settled
rules, and when the commission can be
revoked, if its terms are exceeded’. The prob-
lem is not power and inequality as such: it is
‘capricious inequality and irresponsible
power’. Gradations of authority and income
derived from differences of office and func-
tion are justified as promoting that social
purpose but distinctions based on birth,
wealth, or acquired social position impede
its attainment.8
In Britain, Tawney concludes, liberty and
equality have traditionally been considered
antithetic. If liberty means ‘that every indi-
vidual shall be free, according to his oppor-
tunities, to indulge without limit his appetite
. . . it is clearly incompatible, not only with
economic and social, but with civil and polit-
ical, equality’. In this sense, ‘freedom for the
pike is death for the minnows’.9 Properly
understood, equality is not antithetical to lib-
erty, but only to a particular conception of it.
The contrast with Sumption’s beliefs could
hardly be more pronounced. Sumption
claims that the kind of egalitarian society
‘being constructed in the name of equality in
many parts of the world’, whether acting in
the name of Marx or Tawney, amounts to
‘levying war on humanity’. Its effect is ‘sim-
ply to replace inequalities of wealth by
inequalities of power’. The quest leads only
to ‘the transformation of government from
an instrument for the enforcement of shared
principles into an instrument by which part
of the population imposes its principles on
another part’. This is especially egregious
because although ‘private wealth like politi-
cal power may corrupt . . . unlike political
power its corruption does not harm
others’.10
Sumption’s basic creed rests on the claims
that a ‘society of autonomous individuals is
the natural condition of mankind’, that it is
natural that humans ‘pursue private rather
than public ends’, and consequently that the
‘duty of government is to accommodate
themselves to this immutable fact about
human nature’. Acknowledging Tawney’s
point that the rich recognise that their inter-
ests are served by political stability and
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those interests might require that ‘the differ-
ences between rich and poor are kept within
bounds’, he accepts that, to that extent,
redistribution is justified: ‘But its justification
goes not one inch further’. All further claims
to equality are based on ‘romantic notions of
fellowship’ which turn out to be self-defeat-
ing.11
Sumption concludes that there is ‘no
greater tyranny possible than denying to
individuals the disposal of their own talents’,
that ‘there is no such thing as assessable
merit’, and that ‘statistical demonstrations of
income distribution in support of the egali-
tarian cause are an appeal to envy and an
abuse of people’s dissatisfactions and disap-
pointments in support of a cause with which
those dissatisfactions and disappointments
have no logical connection’.12 His main pur-
pose is to defend the acquisitive society
against the egalitarian aim of organising
society on the basis of social purpose. This
may go some way to explaining why he
abandoned his academic career as an histo-
rian because he was ‘fed up with being
broke’. Sumption also rejected a political
career, not just because of the ‘demands it
makes on one’s time’ but because ‘there is
not much of any interest below the top’.13 A
career at the commercial bar beckoned.
III
In the light of these radically different politi-
cal views on equality, can there really be any
similarity in Griffith and Sumption’s
accounts of law, politics and constitution? It
is of course conceivable that those with dif-
ferent views on equality could hold similar
views on the proper spheres of law and poli-
tics. But that would depend on a similarity
in understanding of the nature of law and
politics and this, I suggest, is implausible. I
begin by first situating Griffith’s argument in
its appropriate political context.
Griffith believed in a socialist cause, simi-
lar to that advocated by Tawney, which
anticipated using the machinery of the state
to bring about a peaceful transformation of
capitalism to socialism. The establishment of
political democracy was only the first stage
in the extension of democratic principles and
methods into other spheres of economic and
social life. And the success of that strategy
rested on the ability of a Labour Party advo-
cating socialist policies acquiring majorities
in the House of Commons and then using
parliamentary legislation to bring about
social change. For this purpose, a legal phi-
losophy that conceived law simply as a
means to an end and treated the Act of Par-
liament as the highest form of law was emi-
nently suitable. This was of first importance
because, after universal suffrage was
achieved in 1928, it was still the case that all
the other institutions of the state—the Lords,
the judiciary, the higher civil service, the
defence forces—remained under the control
of an old order that might place obstacles in
the way of such a programme. Any legal
philosophy other than a sociological posi-
tivism that views law as an expression of
will and recognises the will of Parliament to
be the highest law could be used to defeat
these democratising objectives.
Twentieth century achievements towards
these objectives should not be underesti-
mated. They included, in Tawney’s words,
‘the legal enforcement of minimum stan-
dards of life and work; the expansion of dif-
ferent forms of communal provision
designed to make accessible to all advan-
tages previously confined to the minority
with the means to buy them; the use of
financial measures to reduce economic
inequalities; and the transference of certain
foundation services to public ownership’.14
By the 1970s, however, belief in the continu-
ing efficacy of the project was faltering, sig-
nified by concerns over ‘stagflation’,
governmental overload, and a growing fiscal
crisis of the state. When after 1979, the legal
philosophy advocated by socialists appeared
to have been taken over by Thatcherite
forces pursuing an agenda of the ‘free econ-
omy and strong state’, socialists were left
without any legal-constitutional resources of
resistance.
This dilemma led to a splintering of the
left, with such radicals as Ralph Miliband,
G.A. Cohen and Tom Nairn in 1988 joining
Liberals—and some Conservatives—as foun-
der signatories to Charter 88, a movement
advocating fundamental constitutional
reform. Scrolling down three decades, we
see the fruits of this new constitutional phi-
losophy expressed by a new generation of
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liberal judges educated in a rights-based
rather than a traditional rule-based jurispru-
dence, and possessing a greater willingness
to engage in active review of what they per-
ceive to be reactionary legislation.
Sumption’s Reith lectures on ‘Law and the
Decline of Politics’ are written in the context
of—and in opposition to—these develop-
ments.15 That is understandable. Less under-
standable is that his argument appears to be
founded on the need to maintain democracy
as the constitution’s key value. This element
of his argument calls for closer examination.
In a reprise of Dicey’s thesis in Law and
Public Opinion in the Nineteenth Century,
Sumption first claims that the ‘vast expan-
sion in the domain of law’ in modern times
is attributable to ‘the arrival of a broadly-
based democracy between the 1860s and the
1920s’.16 The coming of political democracy
has led to ‘rising demands of the State as a
provider of amenities, as a guarantor of min-
imum standards of security and as a regula-
tor of economic activity’. And what drives
this ‘growing public appetite for legal rules’
is ‘the quest for greater security and reduced
risk’.17 In place of the socialist claim that leg-
islative power protects the most vulnerable
and promotes more opportunity, he is sug-
gesting that, having acquired the vote, the
people—the masses—are using it to demand
that the state protect them from the ordinary
risks of life.
This is tendentious. The developments he
highlights are the result of a new phase of
modernisation, driven by technological inno-
vation and symbolised in the progression
from the steam train to supersonic flight,
from coal to nuclear fission, from the type-
writer to the microchip. These developments
also signify a shift from laissez-faire to organ-
ised capitalism, an evolution that is only in
the most tangential sense associated with the
extension of the franchise. These structural
changes are now presenting people with
risks of a novel type and scale. Socialist leg-
islation had indeed sought to mitigate some
of those risks. ‘The brutal truth’, wrote Taw-
ney, ‘is that down to 1939 the economic sys-
tem was kept running by hunger and fear’
and only since the Second World War has a
policy of full employment coupled with wel-
fare provision destroyed the conditions of
that ‘barbarous discipline’.18 In claiming that
the quest for security is attributable to the
arrival of democracy, Sumption makes the
elementary error of confusing effects with
cause.
It is perhaps because many of the emanci-
patory aspects of welfare policies have been
eliminated since 1979 that Sumption now
replaces envy with security as the driving
force of legislative action. What has changed
in recent years, he argues, is ‘the degree of
risk that people are prepared to tolerate in
their lives’ and that ‘unlike our forebears, we
are no longer willing to accept the wheel of
fortune as an ordinary incident of human
existence’.19
That rather depends. The great majority
have always lived with a high degree of
unforeseeable risks—of being plunged into
poverty by illness, pregnancy, industrial acci-
dent, factory closure, and so on. The welfare
state alleviated some of these, but we now
face a range of newly manufactured risks
generated by forces that can sometimes seem
beyond political control. Often these are glo-
bal risks, unrestricted by place or time, and
when they do materialise, as with the 2008
banking crisis, the state’s role has been to
bail out those responsible. The risks have
certainly changed, but does this have any-
thing to do with our capacity to tolerate
them? And though they have changed, their
distribution remains the same: wealth accu-
mulates at the top and the burden is borne
at the bottom.
Blind to these structural changes, Sump-
tion believes the main cause of law’s
expanded domain is that ordinary people
now regard security as an entitlement. We
have, he claims, arrived at ‘one of the
supreme ironies of modern life: we have
expanded the range of individual rights,
while at the same time drastically curtailing
the scope of individual choice’.20 Can this
really be justified to those for whom access
to education opened up a world of opportu-
nities not available to their parents, or to
women who have only recently escaped tra-
ditionally imposed roles, or to ethnic minori-
ties no longer facing the most blatant forms
of prejudice, or to disabled people who now
have greater access to public facilities?
For Sumption, the state has become a
Leviathan; in place of a seventeenth century
‘absolute monarchy’, we have created
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‘absolute democracy’.21 Whatever else this
analysis demonstrates, it reveals a great gulf
between his and Griffith’s views on democ-
racy. What Griffith saw as the possibility
that the majority would no longer be treated
as instruments manipulated by property
owners, Sumption regards as a threat to
existing liberties. The danger we now face,
he concludes, is that ‘demands of democratic
majorities for state action may take forms
that are profoundly objectionable, even
oppressive, to individuals or to whole sec-
tors of our society’.22 Since their views not
only on equality but also on democracy radi-
cally diverge, what prospect is there of their
ideas of politics and law converging?
IV
The title of Sumption’s second Reith lecture
is ‘In Praise of Politics’. The most provoca-
tive aspect of his argument is not, as he
seems to think, his defence of ‘the political
process with all its imperfections’.23 It is that,
following his analysis of the threats pre-
sented by the establishment of democracy,
he conceives politics not as the method by
which popular demands might be advanced,
but by which they may be limited and con-
trolled. There are, he says, two basic meth-
ods by which popular demands might be
curtailed: one is by enacting a modern con-
stitution that becomes the fundamental law
which the judiciary will protect, and the
other is through the practices of representa-
tive democracy in which politicians are
entrusted with the task of making laws and
holding governments to account. Sumption’s
lectures are devoted to extolling the virtues
of the latter over the former.
There are serious weaknesses in his argu-
ment. In the British tradition of democratic
socialism, politics is a set of practices that
acknowledges the equal worth of individu-
als, holds out the prospect of each having an
equal voice in the collective activity of gov-
erning, and provides the means of enabling
individuals to negotiate their differences and
devise collective ways to achieve objectives
that cannot be met with the same degree of
success by individual effort. As we will see,
this is not the conception of politics that
Sumption defends.
A skilled advocate, he first presents the
merits of adopting an entrenched constitu-
tion. The attractions of giving judges the task
of constitutional guardians, he concedes, are
manifold. Judges are ‘intelligent, reflective
and articulate’, they are ‘intellectually hon-
est’ and ‘they know a great deal about the
world’. Even as they have recently ‘inched
their way towards a notion of fundamental
law overriding the ordinary processes of
political decision-making’, they have always
operated on the principle of legality. And
law—he means judge-made law—is ‘ra-
tional’, ‘coherent’ and ‘analytically consistent
and rigorous’.24 Such praise deviates dramat-
ically from the classic account Griffith has
given in The Politics of the Judiciary.25 Surely
anyone who believes Sumption’s eulogy of
judges and law must be racing to sign up
for constitutional reform. But these virtues
notwithstanding, Sumption argues that the
price for handing over the resolution of
debatable policy issues to judges is too high.
The main problems are that litigation is not
a participatory process, that it cannot medi-
ate differences and that in public affairs legal
values may not always be virtues: ‘Opacity,
inconsistency and fudge may be intellectu-
ally impure, which is why lawyers don’t like
them, but they are often inseparable from
the kind of compromises that we have to
make as a society if we are going to live
together in peace’.26
What, then, is his case for politics? Atten-
tive to the dangers of the tyranny of electoral
majorities, Sumption places his faith in the
principle of representative government. Rep-
resentative politics, he argues, has been the
most effective way of taking the multiplicity
of interests into consideration and accommo-
dating differences. And the most efficient
way of achieving this accommodation has
been through political parties. He rightly
notes that, being coalitions of opinion, British
political parties have never been monolithic.
But he wrongly asserts that they are ‘the
creatures of mass democracy’.27 British polit-
ical parties in fact came into existence during
the eighteenth century. They were formed
not as expressions of democracy, but as
mechanisms by which the landed class could
wrest control of the state from the Crown
and then control parliamentary business.
Ministries could be efficiently formed and
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overthrown, notwithstanding differences in
party allegiance, because members of this
landed class shared a common background,
received the same schooling and values,
intermarried, moved in the same circles, and
drew on the same common stock of ideas.
Whether Whig or Tory, they believed in the
essentials of commercial and imperial action
and in the need to protect life, liberty and
property from undue governmental interfer-
ence. The feted flexibility of the British con-
stitution rested on the foundation of a set of
material interests it was the fixed policy of
the state to protect.
The British constitution retained this char-
acter well into the twentieth century, when
Arthur Balfour confidently proclaimed that
‘our whole political machinery presupposes
a people so fundamentally at one that they
can safely afford to bicker; and so sure of
their own moderation that they are not dan-
gerously disturbed by the never-ending din
of political conflict’.28 The great modern
achievement of the British parliamentary sys-
tem has been to ensure that the Labour
Party, formed to give parliamentary repre-
sentation to the working class, could be fit-
ted into this frame. It is this tradition that
draws Sumption’s admiration. The parlia-
mentary system, he recognises, has evolved
a method of decision making ‘which has the
best chance of accommodating disagree-
ments between citizens as they actually are’,
achieving results which, ‘however imperfect,
are likely to be acceptable to the widest pos-
sible range of interests and opinions’.29
This is puzzling. Can such a view be rec-
onciled with Sumption’s earlier claims that
modern government merely converts
inequalities of wealth into inequalities of
power, or that it has evolved from a method
of enforcing shared principles into an instru-
ment for imposing convictions held by one
section of the population on another? Per-
haps he believes that since 1979, British gov-
ernment has abandoned an egalitarian ethos
—if so, this might be the closest point of coa-
lescence between his and Griffith’s views.30
But in any case, Sumption now modifies his
position, saying that democracy cannot mean
majority rule; a majority is sufficient to
authorise governmental acts but ‘is not
enough to make them legitimate’.31
The conditions of legitimacy in which he
has such faith are the type of representative
politics extolled by Burke and Madison.
Sumption is rather economical on this point
but his position seems similar to Madison,
who in No. 10 of The Federalist Papers argued
that the effect of representation is ‘to refine
and enlarge the public views by passing
them through the medium of a chosen body
of citizens whose wisdom may best discern
the true interest of their country and whose
patriotism and love of justice will be least
likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations’. Madison was defending the
establishment of a modern republic which
had democratic elements—the election of
leading figures who ‘can fairly be expected
to bring to their work a more reflective
approach’—but which was designed to con-
tain popular demands and maintain the tra-
ditions of aristocratic rule.32 Sumption, it
would appear, hankers after the traditions of
parliamentary government of the high Victo-
rian era.33
But do these traditions retain their author-
ity today? Sumption readily acknowledges
the warning signs that Parliament is no
longer performing its traditional role effec-
tively. He accurately identifies the signals:
declining turnout at general elections, decline
in membership of political parties, the wan-
ing of the two-party system, survey data
indicating decline in rates of public engage-
ment and a growing distrust of professional
politicians, a growth of ‘regional nation-
alisms’, faltering economic growth and rela-
tive economic decline, and growing
inequalities. These factors feed a perception
of the remoteness of politicians from citizens
and generate feelings of disempowerment.
They are all signals of the erosion of the con-
ditions of legitimacy of the parliamentary
system. Such limitations when combined
with his eulogistic portrayal of the value of
judges as constitutional guardians might
suggest that his own arguments present a
strong case for basic reform. But this is not
in his brief. Warning us against the tempta-
tion of seeking institutional solutions to
political problems, his discourse concludes
on an enigmatic note: if ‘our political culture
has lost the capacity to identify common pre-
mises, common bonds and common
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priorities’ then the problem—and solution—
lies ‘in ourselves’.34
V
Quite where that leaves us is anybody’s
guess. At the last moment Sumption falters.
Suggesting that perhaps a couple of institu-
tional reforms might improve matters, he
proposes adopting a more proportional sys-
tem of representation in parliamentary elec-
tions (one variant of which was rejected by
referendum in 2011) and the avoidance of
referendums. His comments on referendums
are revealing. Recognising Brexit as a divi-
sive issue, he deplores the fact that although
‘a classic case for the kind of accommoda-
tions which a representative legislature is
best placed to achieve’ it has proven difficult
to manage. The culprit is the 2016 referen-
dum which has taken decision making out
of the hands of professional politicians, has
prevented them undertaking an independent
assessment of the national interest and
which ‘obstructs compromise by producing a
result in which 52 per cent of voters feel
entitled to speak for the whole nation and 48
per cent don’t matter at all’.35
About this Sumption is not wrong. But
again he is surprisingly economical in his
consideration of the issue. He writes as
though the referendum were triggered by
some automatic mechanism rather than
being a manifesto commitment of the party
that won the 2015 election. And he fails to
register that it was authorised by an Act of
Parliament approved in the Commons by 90
per cent of MPs, with even Caroline Lucas
for the Greens declaring in the debates that
they ‘have long called for a referendum on
EU membership, not because we are anti-
EU, but because we are pro-democracy’.36 If
the parliamentary representatives in whom
Sumption places his faith have failed, it is
surely because they are constitutional neo-
phytes who have failed to think carefully
about the institutional mechanism they set in
train. Rather than simply decrying the exer-
cise, Sumption might have taken the oppor-
tunity to reflect on the importance not just of
parliamentary practice but also of constitu-
tional design.
The bigger issue concerns the substantive
question of UK membership of the EU.
Sumption spends an entire lecture criticising
the fact that the main source of human rights
law in Britain is an international treaty, but
has nothing to say about the EU. The human
rights treaty, he informs us, is a ‘dynamic
treaty’, one that escapes parliamentary con-
trol because it ‘provides a supranational
mechanism for altering and developing it in
future’.37 Yet this is small beer compared
with the EU treaties. In the case of human
rights, domestic courts need only take
account of the rulings of the Strasbourg
court and do not have the power to disapply
Acts of Parliament. In contrast, the EU trea-
ties establish supranational mechanisms not
only for extending the meaning of the trea-
ties, but which also impose duties on domes-
tic courts to apply the rulings of the Court of
Justice of the EU and, if necessary, to disap-
ply parliamentary legislation. And EU legis-
lation is a much greater source of law than
that deriving from Strasbourg.
If Lord Sumption is truly concerned about
the extent to which law making has been
taken away from normal parliamentary pro-
cesses, the attention he gives to human
rights issues as compared with regulatory
law making by EU institutions is startling.
We are again required to speculate. So,
whereas socialists might praise Roosevelt’s
four freedoms (freedom of speech, freedom
of worship, freedom from want, and free-
dom from fear) and Beveridge’s bid for free-
dom from want, disease, ignorance, squalor
and idleness, the four freedoms on which
the EU is built (of goods, services, capital
and labour) are the type of purely economic
freedoms about which Sumption might be
expected to be more enthusiastic.
VI
Sumption’s study of the rise of law and
decline of politics is a curious work. I have
tried to show that its similarities with Grif-
fith’s views are superficial, the differences
profound. The differences in their beliefs on
the political value of equality, on the
achievements of political democracy, on the
strengths of the parliamentary system, on
the merits of the judiciary, and on the
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possibilities of politics are so great as to
make comparison of their views on the
proper role of law and politics spurious. But
even on its own terms, Sumption’s argu-
ments are eccentric. They could be made, it
seems, only by someone who has spent his
entire life in the cloistered environments of
English public schools, Oxford colleges, the
Inns of Court and latterly in Parliament
Square. They employ the predictable tech-
nique of invoking the greats, opening with
Aeschylus, with nods towards Blackstone,
Hume, Burke, Madison, Mill and de Toc-
queville, before closing with Disraeli, ‘the
only true genius ever to rise to the top of
British politics’.38 It is an 1844 novel by Dis-
raeli which helps us appreciate Sumption’s
theme of self-reliance. In Coningsby, in which
the eponymous hero leaves Eton penniless,
is obliged to work at the bar and eventually
has his fortune restored, Disraeli writes that
‘the peril of England’ is found not in laws
and institutions but in ‘the decline of its
character as a community’. It is as provoca-
tive a thought as the ending of the last of
Sumption’s lectures and it left this reader
hoping for a further moment of introspection
by the lecturer. But that never comes.
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